Abstract-In a cooperative game with transferable utility, it is usually assumed that all coalitions are equally feasible. However, if we deal with cooperative games with coalition configuration, only some coalitions are a priori feasible, due to the preferences of the agents. In this paper, we propose a generalization of games with coalition configuration. In our model, the feasibility of a coalition is determined by the cohesion of its members, and obviously, this cohesion does not have to be equal for all coalitions. The cohesion of each coalition will be determined by a cohesion index. We introduce the class of games with cohesion index and propose an allocation rule, which is characterized by using reasonable properties. The cohesion idea is not only a concept related to social groups. In software design, this concept explains the relationships among all the elements of a module. Our value can be applied in this way as we show in the paper.
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I. INTRODUCTION

C
OOPERATIVE game theory studies situations where a set of agents (players) bargain to allocate a common profit obtained from their collaboration. The resulting allocation is given by a vector (payoff vector) whose coordinates are the payoffs assigned to the players. A game on a set of players is modeled by a function (characteristic function) that assigns to each subset of players (coalition) the profit that the members of the coalition can achieve when they decide to cooperate. The Shapley value [1] is one of the most studied solutions for cooperative games. It is a correspondence that assigns a payoff vector to each game based on a set of reasonable conditions (axioms), which allow us to compare this value with alternative allocations. Several variations of the Shapley value have been proposed for situations where some additional information is known. Frequently, this additional information is about the interpersonal relationships among the players. This paper focuses on the Owen variation [2] . In that paper, it is considered that there exists a partition of the set of players based on the affinities between them. Owen proposed a Shapley-type solution which takes into account that information in order to get a fair allocation of the profit obtained by the grand coalition. Later on, Albizuri et al. [3] introduced coalition configurations as a way of modeling exogenous information. A coalition configuration is a family of coalitions, not necessarily disjoint, whose union is the whole set of players.
They defined an Owen-type value for these situations, named the configuration Owen value. The term group cohesion (see [4] ) refers to the cumulative effect of all the factors causing members of a group to stay in it, the "social glue" that binds a group together while working toward a goal or satisfying the needs of its members. Hence, cohesiveness is a measure of attraction of the group to its members and their resistance to leaving it. A cohesion index assigns a number between 0 and a maximum level to the groups in order to compare their cohesiveness. A coalition configuration can be seen as a family such that the coalitions in the family have the maximum level of cohesiveness, whereas the other coalitions are not cohesive at all. Group cohesion has been studied in different fields, for instance, Sociology and Group Psicology (see [5] ), sports (see [6] ), software design (see [7] ), etc. These studies proposed different measures of cohesiveness and studied the impact of cohesiveness on the performance of a task or project showing the importance of the cohesiveness among all the agents involved in the project so as to achieve good results.
In our paper, we go a step further in the following sense. Suppose that several departments of a company are involved in a project. Once the project is finished and some benefits/costs arise, we are interested in assigning a portion of them to each worker, taking into account the cohesiveness of the departments. To do this, we will extend the model of transferable utility cooperative games. As an example of application of our model, we will consider, in software design, the cost of design, development, and/or maintenance of a program, where each one of its elementary units (modules) is considered as a player. In this setting, a coalition is a set of modules, and its cost is given by the sum of its individual costs if there is no connection among them; if the elements are connected, the cost will be determined taking into consideration the cohesiveness of the coalition. The final goal is to split the total cost among the elements by using a cohesion measure. We can also take a reverse perspective and model the benefit obtained from creating some elements together.
In this paper, our goal is to provide a framework to deal with those situations. We introduce games with coalition cohesion index. A cohesion index will be given by a function on the family of all coalitions. We also provide and characterize a sharing value for games with a coalition cohesion index. Our model extends that of games with a coalition configuration structure, and our value extends the configuration Owen value. This paper is organized as follows. Section II is devoted to some preliminaries on cooperative games, coalition configurations, and fuzzy sets. Cohesion indices are introduced in Section III. In Section IV, we define the Choquet-Owen value for games with a coalition cohesion index. This value is characterized in Section V. Finally, some conclusions are presented.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Cooperative Games
A cooperative game (with transferable utility) is a pair (N, v) , where N is a set of cardinality n ∈ N, and v : 2 N → R is a function with v (∅) = 0. The elements of N are called players, the subsets S ⊆ N coalitions, and v (S) is the worth of S.
is a nonempty coalition, the unanimity game (N, u T ) is given by u T (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S and u T (S) = 0 otherwise. The unanimity games can generate all the characteristic functions in the sense that each game (N, v) satisfies that there exist numbers {α T } ∅ =T ⊆N ⊂ R (named dividends; see [8] ) such that
A payoff vector for the game (N, v) is any x ∈ R N , where, for each player i ∈ N , the number x i represents the payment of i owing to his cooperation possibilities in the game. A value for cooperative games assigns to each game (N, v) a payoff vector in R N . The Shapley value [1] of a game (N, v) is defined for any player i ∈ N as
This value is the only one satisfying the following conditions. (S1) Efficiency: It holds that i∈N Sh i (N, v) = v (N ) for every game (N, v).
(S2) Linearity: For all games (N, v 1 ), (N, v 2 ) and for all a 1 , a 2 ∈ R, it holds that 
B. Coalition Configurations
Let N be a finite set of players in a game situation. Following Albizuri et al. [3] , a coalition configuration of N is a family of nonempty coalitions C = {C 1 , ..., C m } satisfying m p=1 C p = N . These coalitions, that we name groups in the paper, represent a priori unions of the players caused by common interests or social relationships. A coalition structure in the sense of Owen [2] is a particular case of coalition configuration C, whenever C is a partition of N , that is, for all p, q ∈ {1, . . . , m} with p = q, it holds that C p ∩ C q = ∅. A game with coalition configuration is a triple (N, C, v) , where (N, v) is a cooperative game and C is a coalition configuration of N . Since C ∈C C = N , we will denote (C, v) instead of (N, C, v).
A configuration value assigns a payoff vector to each game with coalition configuration. That is, if ψ is a configuration value, then ψ(C, v) is a payoff vector in R N for each game with coalition configuration (C, v) . Particularly, the (configuration) Owen value [3] is a configuration value based on the Shapley value. It is defined following a heuristic development in two steps of bargaining: The first one among the groups and the second one into each group. Let (C, v) be a game with coalition configuration. If C = {C 1 , ..., C m }, then we denote M = {1, ..., m}. The quotient game is the cooperative game
Consider p ∈ M . For each S ⊆ C p , we take the coalition configuration
A game
Finally, the Owen value of (C, v) is given by
The Owen value satisfies the properties of efficiency (O1), linearity (O2), and null player (O3), which are analogous to Property (S1), Property (S2), and Property (S3), respectively, regardless of the coalition configuration. Albizuri et al. [3] introduced three other properties to axiomatize the Owen value: anonymity, coalitional symmetry, and merger.
Anonymity implies that φ satisfies a property similar to the equal treatment property satisfied by the Shapley value. If i, j ∈ N are symmetric players for (N, v) and i ∈ C p if and only if j ∈ C p whenever C p ∈ C, then φ i (C, v) = φ j (C, v). To show this, it is enough to consider the permutation π(i) = j, π(j) = i and π(k) = k for any other player and apply the anonymity property.
Two groups C p , C q ∈ C are symmetric for
(O5) Coalitional symmetry: For every symmetric groups C p , C q ∈ C, it holds that 
C. Fuzzy Sets and the Choquet Integral
The functions minimum and maximum will be denoted by ∧ and ∨, respectively, throughout this paper. Fuzzy sets were described by Zadeh [9] . Let A be a finite set. A fuzzy subset of A is a mapping ρ : A −→ [0, 1], where ρ assigns to a ∈ A a degree of membership. Given a fuzzy set ρ of A, the support of ρ is the set supp (ρ) = {a ∈ A : ρ(a) > 0} and the image of ρ is the set im (ρ) = {ρ(a) : a ∈ A}. We will denote the image of ρ as im (ρ) = {λ 1 < · · · < λ q } when we want to consider that its elements are written in increasing order. The fuzzy sets ρ, ρ of A are called comonotone
A set function over A is any function f : 2 A → R. Observe that if f (∅) = 0, then (A, f ) is a game. The Choquet integral [10] was introduced for monotone games over A (capacities). Later on, Schmeidler [11] studied this integral for all the set functions. If f is a set function and ρ a fuzzy set of A, then the Choquet integral of ρ with respect to f is the continuous operator
where im (ρ) = {λ 1 < · · · < λ r } and λ 0 = 0. The following properties of the Choquet integral are known.
(C1) For all nonempty B ⊆ A,
III. COALITION COHESION INDICES
Let N be a set of agents with |N | = n ∈ N. Suppose that a social analysis of the cohesiveness for each coalition, taking into consideration all the relevant facets of the situation, has been done, and we describe the results of the study by a cohesion index where the most cohesive coalition has level 1. The index of a singleton coalition means the capacity of the agent to keep his positions without the support of the others. This definition corresponds to that of cooperation index, introduced by Amer and Carreras [12] , but the sense is totally different. In a cooperation index ρ, the number ρ(S) is interpreted as the probability that coalition S is formed, and then, the Owen-type value proposed in that case is just an expected payoff; it is not an allocation of the total profit from cooperation.
A coalition cohesion index ρ over N is also a fuzzy set of 2 N (or a fuzzy hypergraph for N ; see [13] ) with special conditions; thus, we can use all the notations and definitions from that context. The coalitions in supp(ρ) are the cohesive coalitions, which are called groups, and im(ρ) is the set of the different levels of cohesiveness. Every nonempty family of nonempty coalitions C ⊂ 2 N can be identified with the coalition cohesion index ρ C over N with ρ C (S) = 1 if S ∈ C and ρ C (S) = 0 otherwise. That is, the coalitions in the family are well cohesive, and the others are not cohesive. In particular, we can identify any coalition configuration C on N with its corresponding coalition index ρ C . Moreover, if we have a coalition cohesion index ρ over N with im(ρ) = {0, 1} and ∪
Given a coalition cohesion index ρ over N , we may find players which do not belong to any cohesive coalition. In our context, they are agents which represent a problem in any group, even for themselves. They can be seen as agents that spoil the cohesiveness of any group. Notice that any coalition configuration C has B(ρ C ) = ∅. Besides, any nonempty family of nonempty coalitions C ⊂ 2 N is a coalition configuration of N \ B(ρ C ). Hereinafter, we will use the notation B(C) instead of B(ρ C ). Let ρ be a coalition cohesion index over N . For every t ∈ [0, 1], we denote the t-level set, given in (6), of ρ as 
Besides, ρ 
where a 0 = 0 and a d+1 = 1.
, and let f be a set function over the families of coalitions in N . Then,
3) Let 0 < a 1 ≤ · · · ≤ a d < 1 and let f be a set function over the families of coalitions. Then
where the last equality follows from Property (C5), Property (C3), and the items above.
IV. CHOQUET-OWEN VALUE
We will define a value that extends the Owen value defined for games with coalition configuration. Definition 4.1: A game with coalition cohesion index is a triple (N, ρ, v) , where (N, v) is a game, and ρ is a coalition cohesion index over N . A cohesion value is a mapping that assigns a payoff vector to each game with coalition cohesion index.
Let (N, v) be a game and C ⊂ 2 N a nonempty family of nonempty coalitions. If we want to assign a payoff vector to (N, C, v) by using the Owen value for games with coalition configuration, we may need to modify the game. We consider that the participation of the buster players is assured without any demand from them. We can take the game 
for every C ⊆ 2 N . We use this family of set functions to extend the Owen value to the family of games with coalition cohesion index.
Definition 4.2: The Choquet-Owen value for games with coalition cohesion index is the cohesion value defined for all (N, ρ, v) and i ∈ N as
Remark 4.1:
The Choquet-Owen value can be expressed using (7) as
for each player i in N , where im(ρ) = {λ 1 < . . . < λ r } and λ 0 = 0. Hence, in order to calculate the payoff of a player, we need to determine a sequence of payoffs in coalition configurations defined by intervals of cohesiveness and then to weight those payoffs according to the measure of the intervals. Therefore, if C is a coalition configuration, then
It is possible to follow a heuristic process as in [3] to get the Choquet-Owen value in two steps (see Section II-B) as we show next. Let (N, v) be a game and C = {C p } p∈M , where M = {1, ..., m}, be a nonempty family of nonempty coalitions of N . We extend the quotient game defined in (1) to our context.
In this game, each coalition of C acts as a player, and the earnings of a coalition of groups are given by the earnings of the union of all the groups in the coalition jointly with the set of buster players. Notice that the set of buster players is not a player in the quotient game. Moreover, if
Let (N, v) be a game and ρ a coalition cohesion index. We take a quotient game for each level t ∈ im(ρ).
where ρ(C p ) = λ r p , and for every k = 1, . . . , r p , we denote
Now, we can follow a procedure similar to that used for the Owen value in order to get the Choquet-Owen value, as the next result states. 
Proof: We consider a coalition cohesion index ρ with
∈ B(ρ) and p ∈ M with i ∈ C p , we will take r p such that ρ(C p ) = λ r p and
By Definition 4.2, (7), (4), and Property (S2), we have
, it suffices to notice that for every S ⊆ C p , it holds that
V. AXIOMATIZATION OF THE CHOQUET-OWEN VALUE
Now, in order to characterize the Choquet-Owen value, we will introduce some axioms similar to those considered for the Owen value. Let Ψ be a value for games with coalition cohesion index.
Efficiency: For all (N, ρ, v) game with coalition cohesion index, it holds that
We consider that buster players should have null payoff.
Buster player property: If i ∈ N is a buster player for the coalition cohesion index ρ, then Ψ i (N, ρ, v) = 0 for any game (N, v).
Linearity: For all games (N, ρ, v 1 ), (N, ρ, v 2 ) and numbers a 1 , a 2 ∈ R, it holds that
The maximal cohesion degree of a player in a coalition cohesion index ρ over N is defined as (N, v) , his payoff in an a-null game (N, v, ρ) should be proportional to his payoff in the simplification to the interval [a, 1].
(S).
A game with a coalition cohesion index (N, ρ, v) is a-null with a ∈ (0, 1] if v(S) = 0, for every S ⊆ N with i∈S ρ i < a. In particular, v(S) = 0 for every S ⊆ B(ρ). Given a null player in
Fuzzy null player property: If i ∈ N is a null player in (N, v) and (N, v, ρ) is an a-null game with coalition cohesion index, then
If two symmetric players are also symmetric for the index from certain cohesiveness level, then the difference between the payoffs obtained in a game with a coalition cohesion index should be proportional to the difference of the payoffs in the simplification to the interval [0, a].
Fuzzy equal treatment property: Let i, j be two symmetric players for the game (N, v) and ρ a coalition cohesion index. If there exists a ∈ [0, 1) such that for every coalition S with
ρ(S) > a, it holds that i ∈ S if and only if j ∈ S, then
The concept of symmetry for players can be extended to groups in the context of coalition cohesion indices. Let (N, ρ, v) be a game with a coalition cohesion index. Two coalitions S, T ∈ supp(ρ) are separable symmetric groups if:
Separable symmetric groups property: Let S, T ⊆ N be separable symmetric groups for (N, ρ, v) with 0 < ρ(T ) ≤ ρ(S).
It holds
i∈S [Ψ i (N, ρ, v) − [ρ(S) − ρ(T )]Ψ i (N, ρ ρ(S ) ρ(T ) , v)] = j ∈T Ψ j (N, ρ, v). Let a ∈ [0, 1). Two players i, j ∈ N are a-double for (N, ρ, v) if: 1
) there are coalitions S, T ⊆ N (they can be equal) with ρ(S), ρ(T ) > a and i ∈ S, j ∈ T ; 2) v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all coalition S ⊆ N ; 3) if S ⊆ N \ {i, j} with ρ(S ∪ {i}) > a, then it holds ρ(S ∪ {j}), ρ(S ∪ {i, j}) ≤ a. If i, j are a-double, then ρ i −j is another coalition cohesion index over N \ {j} defined for all S ⊆ N \ {j} as
otherwise.
We also consider the game (N \ {j}, v i −j ) defined in (5).
Merger of players: Let i, j be a-double for (N, ρ, v). It holds that
Observe what happens with these axioms when we take C as a coalition configuration. Efficiency, linearity, fuzzy null player property, and merger of players (taking into account that im(ρ) = {0, 1} in that case) coincide with the respective axioms in [3] . Moreover, the fuzzy equal treatment property and the separable symmetric groups property coincide with the equal treatment property and the group symmetry property of the Owen value defined in [2] , respectively.
Theorem 5.1: The Choquet-Owen value satisfies efficiency, linearity, fuzzy null player property, buster player property, fuzzy equal treatment property, separable symmetric groups, and merger of players.
Proof: We consider each of the axioms mentioned in the theorem.
Buster player property: Let (N, ρ, v) be a game with coalition cohesion index. If i ∈ B(ρ), then i ∈ B(C ρ t ) for all t ∈ im(ρ).
Hence, (8) Efficiency: We know that the Owen value φ is efficient (O1) for coalition configurations. For each family C ⊆ 2 N , we get
Let (N, ρ, v) be a game with coalition cohesion index. Using Property (C2) and Property (C4), we obtain
Linearity: The linearity of Φ follows from the linearity of the Owen value (O2) over coalition configurations. Let (N, v 1 ), (N, v 2 ) be two games and a 1 , a 2 ∈ R. For each family of coalitions C, we get the equality (
, and then, for every player i ∈ N \ B(C)
Therefore, using again Property (C4), for a coalition cohesion index ρ over N 
Consider any t ∈ im(ρ
N a nonempty family of nonempty coalitions and M = {1, ..., m}. Suppose C p and C q separable symmetric coalitions for (N, C, v) , that is, C p and C q are disjoint and disjoint with the rest of the groups. We prove that p and q are symmetric players for
From the facts that the Shapley value is efficient (S1) and satisfies the equal treatment property (S4), and using Theorem 4.1, we obtain i∈C p (N, C, v) . Now, we take S and T separable symmetric groups for (N, ρ, v) with 0 < ρ(T ) ≤ ρ(S). Using item 3 of Lemma 3.1, we get for each i ∈ S,
Since i is a buster player for ρ 1 ρ(S ) and the Choquet-Owen value satisfies the buster player property,
If j ∈ T by the same reasoning, we obtain
because j is a buster player for ρ 1 ρ(T ) . As S and T are separable symmetric groups for C
Merger of players:
N a nonempty family of nonempty coalitions and M = {1, ..., m}. We denote
Observe that |C i −j | = |C|, because i, j are double players, and then, M also represent the set of subindices of the groups in
because the Owen value satisfies merger (O6). Using (6),
Now consider ρ a coalition cohesion index and i, j a pair of a-double players for some a ∈ (0, 1). By item 3 of Lemma 3.1, we obtain for (N, ρ, v) and k ∈ N \ {i, j}
−j with i ∈ C (otherwise the result is trivial). By the construction of (C
In the following theorem, we prove that the Choquet-Owen value is the only one satisfying the seven axioms above.
Theorem 5.2: The Choquet-Owen value is the only cohesion value satisfying efficiency, linearity, fuzzy null player property, buster player property, fuzzy equal treatment property, separable symmetric groups property, and merger of players.
Proof: Let Ψ be a cohesion value satisfying the axioms in the theorem. Using linearity, it is enough to prove the result for unanimity games. Let ρ be a coalition cohesion index over N with supp(ρ) = {C p } m p=1 and M = {1, ..., m}. It is clear that (N, ρ, u T ) , for every i ∈ B(ρ). It remains to prove the result for nonbuster players. We define
We prove uniqueness by induction on l(ρ).
Base case: Let l(ρ) = 0. Then, C p ∩ C q = ∅, for every p, q ∈ M . Let us consider T ⊆ N and the unanimity game (N, u T ). We prove the result for nonbuster players by a second induction on the size of |im(ρ)|.
Base subcase: If |im(ρ)| = 1, then C is a nonempty family of nonempty coalitions and ρ(C p ) = 1, for every p ∈ M . We consider two cases.
is not a-null game for any a ∈ (0, 1] because u T (T ) = 1 and i∈T ρ i = 0 < a. Every pair of players i, j ∈ B(ρ) are symmetric in the game (N, u T ). Let p ∈ M . Then, ρ(C p ) = 1 > a = 0 and applying the fuzzy equal treatment property, we get
for every i, j ∈ C p . In addition, every pair of coalitions C p , C q ∈ supp(ρ) are separable symmetric groups with
with i ∈ C p and j ∈ C q . Finally, if we apply the efficiency property, we obtain
and for every coalition S ⊆ N with i∈S ρ i < 1, we have i 0 ∈ S and u T (S) = 0. Hence, (N, u T ) is a 1-null game.
is a 1-null game and the value Ψ satisfies the fuzzy null player property. Then, ρ(C p ) = 1 and every pair of players i, j ∈ T ∩ C p are symmetric players. If we apply the fuzzy equal treatment property to the value Ψ, we obtain
for every i ∈ T ∩ C p . In other case, let p, q ∈ M T . Then, C p and C q are separable symmetric groups. Using the separable symmetric groups property, we get
Finally, if we apply the efficiency property, we obtain
General subcase: Suppose that the result is true when |im(ρ)| < K. Let ρ be a coalition cohesion index with |im(ρ)| = K > 1. We also consider two cases.
is not a-null game for any a ∈ (0, 1] because u T (T ) = 1 and i∈T ρ i = 0 < a. Every pair of players i, j ∈ B(ρ) are symmetric in the game (N, u T ). Let p ∈ M . Applying the fuzzy equal treatment property, for every i, j ∈ C p , we get
with i ∈ C q and j ∈ C p , where the last equality follows by the induction hypothesis. Let p 0 ∈ M be such that ρ(C q ) ≥ ρ(C p 0 ) for every q ∈ M . Finally, if we apply the efficiency property and (9) to p 0 and q ∈ M , we obtain
for every j ∈ C p 0 . Finally, using (9), we obtain
is a ρ i 0 -null game because for every S ⊆ N with i∈S ρ i < ρ i 0 , we have i 0 ∈ S and u T (S) = 0. Thus, using the fuzzy null player property, we have
, for every i ∈ T . Furthermore, applying the induction hypothesis to (N, ρ
for every i ∈ T . If M T = {p}, then taking into account that i, j ∈ T ∩ C p are symmetric players and ρ (C p 
Using the efficiency property, we obtain
Now, consider the case |M T | > 1. Besides, every pair of players i, j ∈ T are symmetric players in (N, u T ). Then,
Then, C p and C q are separable symmetric groups, and since Ψ satisfies the separable symmetric groups property, we have
with i ∈ C q and j ∈ C p , where the second-to-last equality follows by the induction hypothesis. Let p 0 ∈ M be such that ρ(C q ) ≥ ρ(C p 0 ) for every q ∈ M . Finally, if we apply the efficiency property and (10) to p 0 and q ∈ M , we obtain
for every j ∈ C p 0 . Finally, using (10), we obtain
, for every i ∈ C q and q ∈ M. General case: Suppose true the uniqueness when l(ρ) < H, regardless of the size of N . Consider ρ with l(ρ) = H > 0. Then, there are p, q ∈ M with p = q such that C p ∩ C q = ∅. Let i ∈ C p ∩ C q . We introduce, following [3] , a new player j / ∈ N and extend the coalitional cohesion index ρ over N ∪ {j} as follows:ρ
We haveρ(C p ) = 0, and hence, l(ρ) < H. We distinguish two cases. 1) i ∈ T . We extend the game u T and the coalitional cohesion index to N ∪ {j} as follows: 
for every k ∈ N \ {i}. Using the induction hypothesis and the fact that Φ also satisfies the merger players property, we have
for every k ∈ N \ {i}. Combining (11) and (12), we obtain
Finally, using the efficiency property, we obtain
Notice thatρ
. Since Ψ satisfies the merger players property, we have
for every k ∈ N \ {i}. Combining (13) and (14), we obtain Ψ k (N, ρ, v) = Φ k (N, ρ, u T ), for every k ∈ N \ {i}. Finally, using the efficiency property, we obtain Ψ i (N, ρ, u T ) = Φ i (N, ρ, u T ).
VI. EXAMPLE
Let us consider a slight modification of the example proposed on [7, Fig. 4] . First of all, we recall some notions about cohesion abstractions in computer science (see [7] , for more details). Roughly speaking, a slice abstraction of a procedure is the set of data slices of the procedure, where a data slice is a sequence of data tokens. In [7] , it is defined the Weak Functional Cohesion as the ratio among the number of glue tokens and the total number Table II. TABLE III  SHAPLEY VALUE FOR EACH GROUP GAME   1  2 Table III shows the amount that the Shapley value assigns to each player in each group game.
Then, the Choquet-Owen value is obtained by adding up each column in Table III   Φ 
VII. CONCLUSION
We can see the model of games with coalition configuration as a class of games with some coalitions having maximal degree of cohesiveness, understanding this value as 1. In this paper, we extend this model to situations where the cohesiveness degree of a coalition is not necessarily maximal. We present the model and also provide a value that can be applied to share the total gain taking into account the cohesiveness degree of all the coalitions. This value is inspired by the Owen value. We show by an example how this value can be used in software design. In the future, we are going to explore the application of any other value or semivalue to this context. Additionally, we can study set-solutions like the core in this setting.
There are some other contexts where our model can be applied. For instance, situations where also uncertainty on payoffs is present (see [14] - [18] ) or additional information like a network is provided (see [19] ). In this last case, since a network can be represented as a coalition cohesion index (1 if the coalition is connected and zero, otherwise), following a similar procedure, we can define globally efficient values by contrast to locally efficient values as the Myerson value (Myerson [20] ). On the other way around, a coalition cohesion index defines a fuzzy hypergraph that can be seen as a conference situation of Myerson (see [21] ). The study of the relationship between both models might deserve some attention in the future.
